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1. FRO\1 BIRTH TO DEATH 
Most businesses are born to die or stagnate. It is no wonder that we are fascinated by 
those few that grow. It is also a natural instinct to pore over the remains of desd 
businesses to try to gather portents for the future. 
There is a substantial turnover in numbers and types of businesses in all western 
countries. However, in the United Kingdom, whilst the number of deaths is fairly 
constant, the number of new firms being set up is rising. By 1984 the surplus of firms 
being set up over those dying was over twice that in 1980 - >6,000 compared to 16,000. 
That gave a net surplus between 1980 - 1984 of 140,000 firms. 
This is a pattern replicated in most of Western Europe’ and the USA. blany countries 
report rising death statistics for businesses but almost 311 (with some notable exceptions 
such as Denmark) report birth rates that are risin s more steeply. Thus, unlike Britain, 
many countries (such as USA) report a higher rate of business turnover. Britain’s birth 
and death statistics now compare favourably with most countries. 
What seeAms a peculiarly British problem is gerting businesses to grow, turning successes 
into companies of truely international scale. ICL, the British computer business which is 
almost five decades old, is now smaller than the Apple Corporation founded just over a 
decade ago. In 1960 the car manufacturer Jaguar was roughly the same size as 
Mercedes-Benz. Today, Daimler-Benz is some 15 times the size of Jaguar and of 
comparable size to ICI. Indeed, ICI is now smaller than two of the top three West 
German chemical companies. 
This problem shows itself in the relative size of Britain’s small business sector. Whilst in 
general, the small business sector, employs between 60% (France) and 85% (Italy and 
Republic of Ireland) of the work-force, in Britain it employs only 37% of the 
workforce. Two out of three of those officially classified as self-employed in Britain do 
not employ anybody else, and this total has been growing rapidly in recent years. 
Stanworth and Curran’ have argued that, as small business owners place great value on 
independence, embarking on a highsrowth strategy might lead them to feel that their 
independence is threatened. Others’ have argued that small business owner-managers 
are aware of their lack of management ability to cope with growth and therefore simply 
reject it. 
What is true in all countries4 is that most small businesses grow only in the first few 
years after start-up and then stablise to provide the owner manager with an acceptable, 
independent life style. At this stage the business is providing sufficient sales to ensure 
survival and to provide an adequate return on investment and standard of living. Most 
owner managers seem satisfied at this ‘comfort level’ and their business does not grow 
beyond it. However, the ‘comfort level’ does seem to vary from country to country. 
2. PORING OVER THE REMAINS 
Businesses can die in many different ways..... and not always for regrettable reasons. 
Often entrepreneurs cease trading in one business to pursue another opportunity. Debts 
may be paid and employees found jobs in the new business. This dynamism is vital. It 
is evidence of the flexibility that can make small business so market responsive. 
However, when the business dies because of insolvency leading to liquidation or 
bankruptcy, it is likely that creditors will be left unpaid, jobs will be lost and the 
businessman himself may lose money and prestige, causing hardship to his family. It is 
this that business analysts try so hard to predict and to prevent. Yet most business 
deaths do not involve bankruptcy or liquidation. Most businesses simply choose to stop 
trading, the owners changing to another activity. In the USA and the UK only about 
10% of business deaths are due to insolvency. 
Various studies give an insight into this process. One by Ganguly and Bannock’ looks at 
VAT registrations and deregistrations in the UK over the period 1973-82, which it uses 
as a proxy for new firm births and deaths. They conclude: 
1. 40 - 45% of businesses will still be trading after 10 years. 
2. Year in, year out, about 9% of businesses can be expected to die (deregister): 
varying between 8% and 15%. However, as might be expected, the early years 
are the riskiest and 60% of deaths (deregistrations) take place in the first 3 years 
of existence. Thus, about one third of businesses cease trading within their first 
three years of life. 
3. This profile of failure is not significantly different between sole 
traders/partnerships and companies. 
4. There are few significant differences between individual sectors. However, the 
service sector, overall, tends to have a higher failure rate than manufacturing 
and construction and within that, the retail sector has actually seen a fall in the 
number of businesses in recent years. Unincorporated businesses tended to have 
a better survival record in production, construction, transport, wholesale and 
motor trades. Companies on the other hand were better in agriculture, retailing, 
professional and financial services and catering. 
Other UK research by Stewart and Gallagher’ using an alternative data base, the files 
of credit rating agency Dun and Bradstreet, broadly supports these conclusions. This 
data base covers about one seventh the number of firms in the VAT studies. However, 
this still represents about 200,000 firms over the period 1971-83, and has the advantage 
that it can distinguish those firms that die or cease trading due to insolvency. It 
highlights the fact that insolvencies increase in times of recession. A surprising result is 
that for the smallest firms (l- 19 employees) the proportion ceasing to trade (for any 
reason) actually falls during times of recession. Deaths fell from 7.3% in 1971-81, to 
6.3% in 1981-82, and to 4% in 1982-83 as the recession worsened. Whilst the death rate 
was higher for small firms than large firms in 1971-81, generally the reverse was true 
by 1982-83. Stewart and Gallagher suggest that this was, in the main, because there 
were fewer new business opportunities and shortages of capital in the recession of 
1981-83. Consequently entrepreneurs were forced to continue in their current business. 
This pattern is replicated in the USA where a study by Harris’ using a similar Dun and 
Bradstreet data base supported these conclusions. However, Harris did conclude that 
small firms in the USA were more likely to cease trading (for any reason) than large 
firms, under all economic conditions. 
3. AXATO~IY OF SUCCESS 
It would be naive to think that opportunities for growth exist for all smaii businesses. 
Indeed certain sectors of any advanced industrial society are almost exclusively the 
preserve of laro,e businesses for example where significant economies of scale exist and 
can only be achieved by large plant size. Equally, it would be naive to suggest that 
there is an unfailing formula for generating growth in a new business. 
Xeverthe!ess, the elements of success may be broadly defined: 
The Entrepreneur The entrepreneur is the key to the successful launch of any 
business. He is the person who per ceives the market opportunity and then has 
the motivation, drive and abiiity to mobiiise resources to meet it. However, it is 
difficult to create a picture of him. Barrow’ tries to catalogue certain typical 
charac~erisrics: 
m Self confident all-rounder . . ..the person who can ‘make the product, 
market it and count the money, but above all they have the confidence 
that lets them move comfortably through unchartered waters’. 
n The ability to bounce back....rhe person who can cope with making 
mistakes and stil1 has the confidence to try again. 
m Innovative skilIs....not an ‘inventor’ in the tradirional sense but one who is 
able to carve out a new niche in the market piace, often invisible to 
others. 
8 Results orientated....to make the business successful requires the drive that 
only comes from setting goals and targets and getting pleasure from 
achieving them. 
m Professional risk taker....ro succeed means taking measured risks. Often 
the successful entrepreneur exhibits an incremental approach to risk 
taking, at each stage exposing himself to only a limited, measured amount 
of personal risk and moving from one stage to another as each decision is 
proved. 
. 
B Total commitment....hard work, energy and single mindedness are . 
essential elements in the entrepreneurial profile. 
However, the entrepreneurial characteristics required to successfully launch a business 
are often not those required for growth and even more frequently not those required to 
manage it once it grows to any size. At the very least the role of the entrepreneur needs 
to change with the business as it develops and grows. However, all too often he is not 
able to make the transition. 
The Product/Service Idea. The product/service idea is an element in the 
success of any business, but its importance is often overstated. An 
innovative entrepreneur can find ways of making existing products and 
services just that little more attractive to the customer. In 1970 David 
Dutton opened the first Pizzaland restaurant in London copying ideas he 
had seen in the USA when he was at Harvard Business School. He 
opened some 30 Pizzalands before selling the business onto United Biscuit 
which expanded the chain further. Almost ten years later Bob Payton 
opened his first Chicago Pizza Pie Factory, also in London. That business 
now has a turnover in excess of f20M per annum with restaurants in 
Barcelona and Paris. The product is different - deep pan pizza - and the 
atmosphere and enthusiasm of the restaurant staff are very different. 
There is no such thing as an ordinary pizza restaurant. 
Nevertheless, the product must be right for the market and available at the time when 
the market wants it. The list of business failures abound with products ‘ahead of their 
time’. The key to any successful business is market responsiveness....understanding the 
customer and their needs. And customers normally expect uniform quality and 
reliability of product across all elements of the marketing mix; product, price, 
promotion and channels of distribution. 
Manapement Understanding the customer and how the product or service 
can be made to fit their needs is a question of good management. 
Understanding the economics of the business’s products or services and 
how they can be turned to the advantage of the business is a question of 
good management. Understanding which opportunities to pursue and 
equally which to avoid can also be a question of good management. 
As the business grows the management style adopted by the entrepreneur needs to 
change, but equally the entrepreneur needs to plan its further development systematically 
and to apply management controls more effectively. 
Figure 1 about here 
Good management means directing all the resources of the business; design, production, 
quality control, finance, sales and customer service; towards the aim of satisfying 
customer needs. It is the mechanism by which the entrepreneur can turn the 
‘product/service idea into a successful business. 
The final element in success is good luck . . ..being in the right place at the right time. 
Every successful entrepreneur has luck although how much is happenstance and how 
much is hard work is another question. 
. 
4. STRXTEGTES FOR SUCCESS 
The average size of businesses varies from industry to industry. For example, the 
average size of a chemical firm is very large, whereas, the average size of retail firms is 
relatively small. The most fundamental reason for this is the extent to which economies 
of scale affect-an industry; that is, how the total cost per unit produced changes as 
more units are produced. Generally, this can be expected to decline up to some point; 
for example, as an expensive piece of machinery is used more fully. However, beyond 
this point unit costs may start to increase; for example as economies of scale of 
production become increasingly offset by rising distribution costs. The potential of 
economies of scale are often greatest in capital intensive industries like chemicals. 
Figure 2 about here 
This is shown diagrammatically in Figure 2. Total costs include production, selling and 
distribution costs and are therefore dependent upon the state of technology, the size of 
the market and the location of potential customers. The unit cost for industry X. turns 
up at a relatively low level of output, implying the optimal size of firm is relatively 
small in contrast to industry B. where there are considerable economies of scale. Porter9 
calls these ‘fragmented’ industries, where economies of scale just do not exist and large 
firms therefore cannot dominate the industry. 
As Dewhurst and Burns” have pointed out, small businesses will not be able to survive, 
in the long run, in an industry where economies of scale exist and are important. 
This bold statement must, of course, be explained, since we all know of examples where 
small firms have survived and prospered in industries where economies of scale exist. 
There are two major reasons for this. 
1. The market or product is new and economies of scale are being developed. 
Firms have not yet had time to grow to their optimal size. In this case small 
firms must grow and aim to become large firms early in their life cycle.... simply 
to ensure their survival. These are the ‘big bang’ companies, they tend to be the 
glamorous ones that make the news headlines. However, obtaining market 
dominance is a high risk strategy and this road to high growth has many 
. casualties on the way. 
2. While economies of scale of production exist the market for the product is ’ 
limited, either in total or geographically, and the theoretical optimal size is not 
achievable. This happens particularly in highly specialised industries. But 
specialism can be product or market based. Indeed having a differentiated, 
specialist product or service often goes hand in hand with having a well targeted 
market segment. This is called following a ‘niche’ strategy. It is important for 
small firms since it offers a better chance of selective, substainable growth than 
the ‘big bang’ strategy. 
An example of this is the micro-computer industry. Born in the late 1970s with . 
unknown demand for its products and no established producers, it has grown rapidly. 
However, the industry offers substantial economies of scale, particulary in R & D for 
hardware and ‘Software. Consequently, the market has consolidated with many small 
firms going out of business. The survivors have been one of two types of firm. Firstly 
firms like the Apple Corporation, which recognised that the industry would eventually 
be dominated by a few large firms offering low cost or premium quality products. 
Apple grew rapidly, grabbing market share world wide so that it is now in a good 
position to compete with the big company entrants such as IBM. Secondly, the firms 
like Sun Computers which specialised in CAD/CAIM equipment and targetted quite 
specific market segments. As often happens, it has been the middle sized firm which 
has pursued neither strategy which has suffered in this industry. 
There is a strong element of luck in the ‘big bang’ strategy or put more scientifically it 
is a high risk strategy. Often firms only realise that it is the strategy they must adopt as 
the market or technology for the product or service develops. This is because the 
company needs to establish: 
1. That the technology offers the economies of scale (and often cost curves can 
change dramatically over time). 
2. That these economies are in some way important to the customer (through lower 
price or other advantages). 
3. That they are achievable, given the market size. 
Certainly, ‘niche strategy’ offers the better chance of success. It involves filling or 
creating gaps in the market that big firms find unsuitable for their large investment 
capacity. It involves specialising in customers or products, not methods of production. 
It emphasises the non price elements of the marketing mix, such as quality, and 
satisfying a small, clearly defined target market or segment which have these specialised 
needs. Frequently, small firms stress their inherent strengths in innovation, flexibility or 
personalised service. 
One apparent problem with niche strategy is that it is based, by its very nature, on a 
limited market. However, what might be limited for a large company often offers wide 
opportunities to the small. Frequently, entrepreneurs pursuing niche strategies find 
further growth by diversification. This diversification is particularly effective if it 
pursues further niche opportunities. 
The initial sta t-up of a business is often related to a ‘disturbance event’ in the owner- 
*manager’s life 11 , Sometimes growth of a business beyond the ‘comfort level’ is triggered 
by a similar ‘disturbance event’ such as a change in competition or customer tastes. 
Frequently these events pose distinct threats to the survival of a business and failure to 
react can lead to failure of the business. A key element after the ‘disturbance event’ is 
often the presence of a ‘mentor’ or ‘credi,bJe example’ who coaxes the business and the . 
entrepreneur through this difficult phase . 
5. THE LIFE CYCLE DYYAMTC 
The life-cycle concept is a relatively simple idea which provides a useful framework for 
looking at the development of a small business. The idea is that every product or 
service. and therefore any business tied to just one product or service, faces a life cycle 
of five stages, shown in Figure 3. 
Figure 3 about here 
Stage 1: Introduction. This is the stage where the product or service is introduced and 
encounters a certain amount of consumer ignorance and resistance. Sales are low and 
growing slowly and profits are low or negative. 
Stage 2: 
popular. 
Take-Off. This is the short period when the product: or service becomes ver). 
Sales and profits grow rapidly, atrraccing new entrants to the industry. 
Stage 3: Slowdown. After a while, the rapid growth slows down as competing products 
or services enter the market and it becomes saturated. Profirs might actually dip at this 
stage. 
Stage 4: Maturity. Eventually the market becomes saturated and sales are static. * 
Product sales may simply be for replacement. With some products or services this period 
may be relatively short, for others it can last for years. Often it can be extended by 
giving the product or service a face-lift, as car manufacturers regularly do. 
Stage 5: Decline. After some time, sales will start to decline as substitute, improved 
products or services become more attractive and the old product becomes obsolete. 
Different businesses have different life cycle curves. Our ‘big bang’ company will 
experience a rapid and dramatic take off. It also faces the danger of an equally 
dramatic decline into bankruptcy. The ‘niche’ business will probably plateau at a lower 
level of sales bur will have greater certainty of an elegant maturity. 
As the business takes off the owner manager will have to recruit more people. His style 
of management probably needs to change with the life cycle of the business. The new, 
growing firm operates in an uncertain, unpredictable and often ambiguous environment. 
Whilst continuing as the risk-taker, always searching for new market opportunities, the 
entrepreneur needs to develop his team and delegate more and more. Delegating to 
those closest to the problem necessitates tolerating mistakes, supporting and protecting 
staff as they grow into their jobs, encouraging them to experiment and test the market 
and rewarding their successful initiatives. Inevitably, there will be some confusion and 
ambiguity of tasks and a certain amount of internal competition. However, 
organisational structures need to be formalised as the business grows. 
As the business approaches maturity the environment should become more stable and 
predictable and the emphasis probably shifts to control. The owner-manager may well 
become less of a risk taker as he has more to lose. The emphasis will probably also shift 
to maintaining stability, fine tuning and structuring the business more tightly; 
coordinating activities, eleminating overlap, careful analysis. 
This move towards greater control will necessitate more formal systems. Entrepreneurs 
start out able to control their affairs by physical inspection and personal discussion, but 
as the scale of activities increases, they have to rely increasingly on written information 
supplied on a regular and timely basis. The successful business learns this lesson early in 
the take off stage. 
A new business therefore faces a rapidly changing economic environment which, in turn, 
places great, and rapidly changing demands on the owner manager. Figure 4 breaks 
down stages 1 and 2 of the traditional life cycle into four distinct phases when the 
economic imperatives and problems faced by the owner manager change rapidly. 
Figure 4 about here 
Phase 1 : Existence and Suwival. This is the crucial phase dealt with in the preceding 
chapter when the owner manager is larger on his own. probably doing a little of 
everything himself and supervising any employees directly. There are unlikely to be any 
formal management control mechanisms . - 
G The major problem facing the entrepreneur is finding customers. As the business 
develops, those with real growth potential will be developing the uniquenesses in the 
product offerings that are so important later on. Cash flow is the major control 
imperative. Many business will not survive this first phase, mainly because they never 
gain sufficient customer acceptance and they run out of start up capital. 
Phase 1 : Consoiidation and Control. This is the phase when the owner manager is 
proving that he can obtain repeat sales and that the business is really sufficiently 
profitable to provide the opportunity he is seeking. The business with real growth 
potential must be refining its unique selling proposition by this phase. Cash flow 
remains crucial but new budgets and targets will strut to be set. Organisations remain 
simple. As in Phase 1, the owner manager & the business and control still tends to be 
informal, however, by this stage any business that is not planning its cash flow is 
unlikely to have survived. 
Most businesses will not develop beyond this phase. Either the market potential for 
growth will not exist or the owner manager will decide he does not want to see the 
business grow. If the business is to stay at this level then some basic financial, - marketing and production,:syitems must come into place. As long as the environmental 
changes do not destroy the market niche or inefficient management squander the 
resources, the business can probably stay at this phase indefinately. 
Phase 3 : Control and Planning. Those businesses that have growth potential which the 
owner manager wishes to capitalise upon now come into a crucial phase of refining 
control and marshalling the resources needed for growth. The most important element in 
this is recruiting, delegating to and developing staff. Control systems have to be 
installed to monitor subsequent growth and this should provide the opportunity to 
improve margins by controlling costs and even gaining some modest economies of scale. 
In this phase the owner manager needs to set down his strategic plans and look for the 
resources needed for the next phase. He must also prove that he can combat the 
competition that will inevitably emerge if the business is successful. 
Phase 4 : Exoansion. This is the exciting phase when the business really does take off. 
However, to do so, there must be sufficient good staff in place with their roles clearly 
defined and their activities properly coordinated. Many entrepreneurs really just cannot 
do this and therefore the premature expansion can lead to failure for the business. At 
this stage the business must be sufficiently strong that it is able, not only to combat 
competition, but to improve its competitive situation. This is the phase where 
professional management starts to merge. Indeed, many entrepreneurs who recognise 
their inability to cope with this phase will sell out to larger firms who will put in the 
professional staff to manage this important expansion. 
‘: is very difficult to put a time scale on these four phases since each business and 
market opportunity is so very different. However, each phase probably lasts at least one 
year. Having said that, in the UK, Sock Shop came to the Unlisted Securities Market in 
1987 after only five years . . ..a listing that was over 50 times oversubscribed. 
When the business comes to the third stage of its development - slowdown - the 
emphasis is very much on consolidation and effective control. The business must have 
strong accounting controls which enables considerable fine tuning and the achievement 
of economies of scale. 
Figure 5 about here 
Churchill and LewisI have proposed a similar growth model to this. They identify 
eight key factors which determine the success or failure of a business fzucrelating to the 
owner manager and four relating to the company. These factors change in importance as 
the business develops, as shown in Figure 5. The factors are: d 
Owner-manager 
1. Owner’s goals for himself and the business. 
2. Owner’s operational ability in key business areas. 
3. Owner’s managerial ability and willingness to delegate responsibility and to 
manage the activity of others. 
4. Owner’s strategic abilities. 
Comuanv 
5. Financial resources, including cash and borrowing power. 
6. Personnel resources (quality and quantity) particularly at management levels. 
7. Systems resources, in terms of information, planning and control systems. 
8. Business resources, including customer goodwill, market share, supplier relations, 
manufacturing and distribution process, technology and reputation, all of which 
give the company a position in its industry and market. 
Fiaure 6 about here 
In fact the life cycle concept tells only part of the story. Before a product or service is 
ever launched money will have been spent undertaking market research, developing the 
product, installing new equipment and training staff. Figure 6 shows the probable cash 
flow cycle alongside the life cycle curve. It demonstrates the need for adequate funding 
prior to a product launch and indeed well into its take off stage. This cash flow pattern 
can frequently lead under-capitalised firms into situations of over-trading and illiquidity 
when they, paradoxically, have a successful product and a growing business. 
A study by Ray and Hutchinson 14 of ‘supergrowth’ companies - companies which grew 
rapidly to a stock market quotation - compared to a matched sample of ‘passive’ small 
firms which did not grow to floatation underlines these conclusions. The results are 
summarised in Figure 7 . It is noticeable that the ‘supergrowth’ companies were 
considerably more focussed in their objectives with a strong emphasis on forecasting 
financial data on a regular and timely basis; particularly cash flow but also profit and 
sales. The changing style of management and organisational structure is also apparent as 
the companies move through their life cycle. 
Figure 7 -about here 
The approach of maturity will also lead to its own set of problems. Products or services 
can have the mature phase of their life cycle extended by facelifts. However, at the end 
of the day a business often has to diversify to maintain its growth. This is perhaps a 
more immediate problem for the business following a ‘niche’ strategy with a relatively 
limited market. Where to go next? 
6. PRODUCT Yl.-\RKET STR.ATEGTES FOR FURTHER GROWTH 
In its search for further growth, a business has four options, illustrated in the product 
market matrix in Figure ? . 
1. It can stay with its base product or service and its existing market and simply try 
to penetrate the market further. This is dealing very much with the familiar and 
is normally the lowest risk option. Although the point will come when further 
penetration is not possible or economic. 
2. It can develop related or new products for its existing market. For example, an 
off licence might start to sell soft drinks or cigarettes. This is called product 
development. 
3. It can develop related or new markets for its existing roducts. The off licence 
might open a new branch in a nearby area of the town, or it might try selling 
directly to restaurants. This is called market development. 
4. It might try moving into related or new markets with related or new products. 
The off licence might try selling cigarettes directly to restaurants. Since this 
strategy involves unfamiliar products and unfamiliar markets it is high risk. 
Figure fi about here 
It is generally recognised that in comparing investment in related and unrelated areas, 
not only are the risks of the former lower, but also the returns are higher. LMarke t and 
product development should therefore be incremental from the familiar to the 
unfamiliar. Further, it is claimed that market developments are to be preferred to 
product developments ‘because developing new customers is less risky than developing 
new products’ 1.5 
The strategies discussed above are called ‘horizontal’ strategies. Two further strategies 
for growth are open to the small firm, Firstly, ‘backward vertical integration’; the firm 
becomes its own supplier of some basic raw materials or services. Secondly, ‘forward 
vertical integration’; the firm becomes its own distributor or retailer. Both strategies 
entail new product or service technologies and new customers and are therefore 
relatively risky. 
It is generally accepted that vertical integration is not successful for small firms. I.6 
Perry15 suggests that vertical integration should only be a reaction to competitor’s 
activities, for example to prevent them from controlling raw materials and services. He 
also points out that a period of consolidation should follow any growth surge, ‘not 
because of organisational constraints but because of financial and 
entrepreneurial/managerial constraints’. 
7. ROUTES TO F.\ILURE 
Businesses fail, that is, cease to trade against the will of the owner-manager, because of 
the interaction of the personal characteristics of the entrepreneur with the managerial 
situation he faces within his business. The personal characteristics of the entrepreneur 
are particularly important factors in the early period of a business’s life - when the 
faiiure rate is highest. However, they do not on their own explain the actions of the 
entrepreneur and his business. 
In a survey of the literature, Berryman ‘!lists such personal problems as delegation, 
reluctance to seek help, excessive optimism, unawareness of the environment, inability to 
adapt to change and thinness of management talent. It appears to be generally accepted 
that entrepreneurial firms reflect the personalities of the entrepreneurs who build them 
up. However, the qualities which distinguish between success and failure are often 
disputed. The qualities required to initiate a business are not those recognised to manage 
it as it approaches maturity. De Carlo and Lyons 1 %oint to the lack of guidelines on 
‘how to identify the skills required at different stages’ as well as the lack of research ‘to 
confirm which stages do exist and to determine whether all businesses do, in fact, pass 
through all stages’. It is also apparent that entrepreneurial personalities as well as 
management characteristics vary from industry to industry. 15 
In looking at the managerial incompetences contributing to failure, Berryman, lists some 
2.5 different deficiencies grouped under the general headings of accounting deficiences, 
marketing deficiences, lack of adequate finance and other areas (such as excessive 
drawings, deficiences in accounting and managerial knowledge and advice as well as 
personal problems). Accounting problems are mentioned most frequently in the survey. 
All too many small businessmen rely on their auditors to produce out of date accounts 
on which to base their decisions. However, it has been pointed out that many of these 
problems are merely symptoms of incompetence rather than underlying causes. Although 
they do highlight areas of action for advisers and trainers. 
Larson and Clute’s *’ empirical research is one of the pieces surveyed by Berryman. The 
personal characteristics and managerial deficiences they say lead to failure are shown 
below: 
Personal Characteristics 
8 Exhibits exaggerated opinion of business competency based on knowledge 
of some skill. 
Limited formal education. 
Inflexible to change and not innovative. 
Uses own personal taste and opinion as standard to follow. 
Decision making based on intuition, emotion and non-objective factors. 
Orientated to past, ignores future. 
Does little reading in literature associated with business. 
Resists advice from qualified sources but, paradoxically, accepts it from 
their least qualified. 
Manaperial Deficiencies 
Cannot identify target market or target customers. 
Cannot delineate trading area. 
Cannot delegate. 
Believes advertising is an expense not an investment. 
Only rudimentary knowledge of pricing policy and strategy. 
Immature understanding of distribution channels. 
Does not plan. 
Cannot motivate. 
Believes problems not his making and a loan would solve everything. 
Figure 9 about here 
The personal characteristics of the entreprenuer interact with the management defects 
inherent in the firm. However, the crisis that triggers the decline to failure is often 
brought about by some outside factor, as shown in Figure 9 Berryman talks simply of 
economic, and seasonal conditions, personal problems and fraud, but more generally the 
outside factors may be changes in the market, customer tastes, competition or 
distribution channels. It may also be bad business decisions made by the owner- 
manager. 
Argenti 21 uses a slightly different model, talking simply about ‘defects’ and ‘mistakes’. 
Defects 
Autocratic, dominating chief executive heeding no advice. 
Chief executive also chairman. 
Skills on board unbalanced (e.g. too many engineers). 
No strong financial directors. 
No participating board of directors. 
No depth of professional management. 
No budgeting system....particuiarly cash.flow planning. 
No costing system. 
Failure to respond to change. 
Mistakes 
m High gearing. 
m Overtrading. 
m The ‘big project’ which exceeds the business’s resources. 
The interaction of all these factors leads to symptoms of failure. Some researchers insist 
that most managerial defects are simply symptoms. Others refer to accounting data that 
emerges many months or years after the events as the outward signs of the real 
problems. Argenti lists: 
n Deciine of many financial ratios. 
l Creative accounting and window dressing to ‘improve’ profits. 
8 Failing staff morale and non-replacement or repair of equipment and 
facilities. 
This insight into the process of failure is valuable, not only because it may help to avoid 
that event, but also because it reinforces so many of the lessons of success. However, 
understanding the process of failure, even being able to avoid it, is not the same as 
being able to predict that failure. 
8. PREDTCTIWG F.AIL,URE 
It is a natural human instinct to want to predict the future but it is something we shall 
never be able to do with absolute certainty. However, if it is possible to predict failure 
(insolvency leading to bankruptcy or liquidation) with an acceptable degree of certaint) 
then it might’be possible to take corrective action in advance of the event. As 
bankruptcy rates rise so does the interest in failure prediction models. 
Most failure prediction models are based on financial variables. As such they look only 
at symptoms of failure rather than underlying causes and give only a limited insight into 
the process of failure. Symptoms show up after the inherent mistakes have been made. 
Using financial variables this time lag is likely co be further exaggerated since small 
firms are well known for their tardiness in producing accounts. Indeed for some, this 
might be a contributory factor in their failure. 
These financial models fall into two categories. Firstly, ‘univariate models’ which 
attempt to predict failure based upon the level and trend of a single financial ratio. 
best known of these was tested by Beaver 2’2 
The 
using data from 79 US industrial companies. 
He compared the mean ratios of a group of failed companies with those of the 
. companies that did not fail. The results are summarised in Figure 10 The ratio which 
proved the best predictor was that of cash flow to total debt. As with all ratios, its 
predictive ability declined as the period prior to bankruptcy lengthened. Error rates 
were 13% one year prior and 22% five years prior to bankruptcy. 
Some care needs to be taken when assessing these error rates. Ideally, error rates for 
both the original test sample (on which the model was developed) and a ‘hold-out’ 
sample should be given, as is the case with Beaver. Also, simply to say that 13% of 
companies were misclassified as bankrupt or non-bankrupt is misleading. If I were to 
predict that no firm would ever go bankrupt then, given a large enough sample, my 
error rate would be under l%, given that under 1% of firms go bankrupt in anv one 
year. However, my error rate on failed firms (called a type 1 error) is 100% aid a non 
failed firms (called a type 2 error) is O”h. Analysts are naturally far more interested in 
type 1 errors. Type 1 error rates are invariably higher than type 2 error rates. 
Figure 10 about here 
The second category is ‘multivariate models’ which use multiple discriminant analvsis to 
combine a number of ratios to produce a ‘z-score’. The best known model is that- of 
Altman? 3which combined five ratios, with different weightings, to produce a more 
comprehensive profile of a firm. These results are also summarised in Figure 7.. Whilst 
in the first year error rates are lower than those of Beaver’s model, accuracy falls off 
sharply with time, until three years prior to bankruptcy the model performs no better 
than a naive random prediction model. 
Multivariate models have been criticised for many reasons. 
24 
They would appear to be 
time and situation specific. Altman’s model was based on data from fairly large 
manufacturin companies in the USA during the period 1946-65. When Ray and 
Hutchinson lipplied the model to their sample of UK ‘supergrowth’ companies they 
discovered that nearly half of the companies would have been classified as bank;upt at 
some stage up to their floatation. The matched sample of ‘passive’ companies had a 
much lower proportion in this category. 
Another model by Edmister L ‘(Figure lnjooked specifically at small firms, using data 
from the US Small Business Administration. Overall this model produced an error race 
of 79/o one year prior to failure. However, Edmister had problems with data availability 
since he needed three years data to develop his model and only lj?‘o of those firms in 
the SBA data base could meet that requirement. This led to problems of validation. 
The lack and lateness of financial data for small businesses makes the use of these 
models seem questionable. To make matters worse, significant problems exist in 
establishing the reliability and consistency of the accounting data they use. Rising 
interest rates, a recessionary environment, the availability of credit and other 
macroeconomic factors are also likely to particularly affect small businesses. All in all, 
financial variables are unlikely to prove practical predictors of failure in small firms. 
However, research still continues. 
9. WALL CAlu THINK BlG 
The Prussian military strategist Von Clausewitz said: 
‘Have 3 good object in view’ 
. . ..In other words, think big! 
Small firms can and do grow. Entrepreneurs can and do make a fortune from the 
growth of their business. Some will be able to grow and adapt with the business, others 
will realise that they cannot change and hand the business on to ‘professional managers’. 
Much of government effort and public attention is directed towards new business start- 
ups. Creating conditions for second-stage expansion is important for the economies of 
all countries. 
There are lessons to be learned from business failure, even if failure cannot be reliably 
predicted. More important, however, are the simple strategies for growth that have 
proved successful for so many firms. These involve a thorough understanding of the 
customer, the market place and the economics of the product or service. The reality is, 
however, that most small firms will not follow these strategies. Most small firms will 
not grow. Most small firms are born to die or stagnate. 
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